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Up Cape Cod Convened as a Committee of Correspondence to Reawaken Americans to the Cause of Liberty. |
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Background photo: Cape Cod Sunrise by Joan Ross
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Commentary by Richard Moore .... Richard Moore was an international development professional for over forty years. He has lived and worked in over forty countries in every region, including the Middle East. Prior to moving to Thailand where he now resides, he was in charge of the largest US-funded maternal & child health program in West Bank and Gaza.
Introduction to These Letters One of the things I learned in the 1960’s, when I began to read about Israel and Palestine, was that it was nearly impossible to be neutral about issues of justice as regards who owns and who controls what in the Holy Land. The origins of the current struggle began, of course, more than 2000 years ago, and were then dormant until the First World War. That story may be the focus of a subsequent Letter. Although I used to think that I would be able to rise above partisanship and be totally objective (whatever that is), I now find that it is nearly impossible to avoid becoming “captured” into a position. This is germane since I have developed and will tend to present a certain bias, which will be apparent. Readers can agree or disagree; I simply want to be honest and up-front about this, which is more than one can say about many who take noisy positions on the tangled skein of Israel-Palestine. Most of what I will present will be based on secondary sources. This is not research and it is not original. I will simply pick and choose material that supports or documents what I see with my own eyes, or experience personally, as a day-to-day resident who travels widely and meets many people in different roles and conditions. It is useful—and stimulating—to remember that what is happening here in Israel-Palestine has disproportionate leverage and visibility for so many other political and diplomatic decisions being made in the region and beyond. CROSSING EREZ You have heard so much—nearly all negative--about Gaza. What you find is a crowded and bustling urban area. Conditions are decent, without any obvious evidences of extreme poverty or desperation. You are reminded of other, rather traditional Arab cities on the Mediterranean shore. You are also reminded that this is one of the most densely populated, and most violent, spots in the world. All in all, Gaza is a rather pleasant surprise; a relief from news-engendered expectations of extreme behavior, noise, and death. The “Strip” of course runs right along the Mediterranean, and around Gaza city, the beaches are superb. Everyone you meet is very pleasant, polite, and hospitable. You are now ready to return to Israel through the Erez Crossing, the northern exit from Gaza into Israel. You know that Erez is subject to closings without notice, so you check just before leaving for the checkpoint to try to ensure that you will be able to enter. Even so, the situation may change by the time you get there. Driving out of Gaza City, towards Erez, you transition from the crowds and bustling energies of Gaza City, and now begin to pass, on both sides of the road, several miles of houses which have been demolished. They are tipped into large piles, and are in various stages of collapse: from a large pile of rubble to a jumble of walls and the remnants of a roof. Until recently, these were Palestinian homes which, according to press reports, the residents were given only 10 minutes or so to evacuate forever. With whatever they could carry. The area around these ruins is completely bare. You remember that, since 1967, 11,000 Palestinian homes have been bull-dozed in Gaza, West Bank, and Jerusalem. Presumably for “security” reasons. As you get closer to the crossing point, you see a Jewish “settlement” on higher ground to the left, as well as a menacing fort occupied by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). The fort is surrounded by high walls, with guard towers painted in olive drab, and heavily draped with a camouflage material. The landscape now changes abruptly—into a moonscape. No buildings of any kind, no shops; just open fields with no vegetation. You realize that you have entered a “field of fire,” in military terms, created by the IDF. All around, the ground has been turned over and churned, and is crossed by long, deep ditches. As you proceed, you see an IDF tank by the road observing the few cars approaching Erez. The soldiers observing you from the tank are invisible to you. You have heard that IDF soldiers are trained to shoot first and ask questions later. From the daily reports of shootings, it is easy to believe this to be true. Shortly after, one or two Palestinian soldiers will either stop you, or will let you proceed in your car to the Gaza side of the crossing. This is the first Palestinian check point. If they don’t wave your car through, you have get out of your vehicle right there and walk down the road, across open country, the one-third or so miles to the second Palestinian check point. You are never told why they make the decision they do. You now arrive at the second Palestinian check point. This check point consists of a couple of trailers, one marked Red Cross-Red Crescent, the rest unmarked. A soldier takes your passport and ID card and calls ahead to the Israeli side to get clearance. A crude lean-to provides shelter while you wait for clearance to proceed. These soldiers seem distracted, but are in no way unpleasant. After a wait of at least 15 minutes, you retrieve your passport, and proceed into a crude “tunnel.” You now arrive at the third Palestinian check point, with several soldiers sitting at a table—you can see them from the second check point, several blocks down the tunnel. They take your passport, record some information in a ledger, then wave you on. They are matter of fact, polite; neither pleasant nor otherwise. You then proceed down the tunnel another several city blocks. The tunnel has high walls—maybe 20 feet--on both sides, and a crude corrugated roof as cover. There are no windows or exits in the tunnel. The tunnel is dirty, in poor condition, and depressing. At night the tunnel has the equivalent of a series of bare light bulbs. It is stark. It is normally empty of people. It curves and thus does not permit you to see what comes next. With no distractions, you cannot miss the large section of tunnel wall which has collapsed inward—you realize that this is where a crude Palestinian “Qassam” rocket hit just days before. Just after, you note the walls and roof of a tunnel section peppered with many large, jagged holes. Must have been a grenade or rocket. Whose explosion, and under what conditions? You wonder if anyone was killed. At some point, you realize that there have been no signs in any language providing directions to those crossing. No text, no symbols, no arrows. This is true from one end to the other. This and one’s anxiety about making a mistake around the very young, armed, and jumpy IDF soldiers keeps one’s nerves on edge. As the tunnel curves, the tunnel is blocked by a wall of bars, from top to bottom and side to side. This is the first Israeli check point at Erez. Sometimes there are several people in line at the wall of bars: aid people, journalists, or Palestinians who have somehow managed to obtain permits. You stop at the wall of bars, facing them, noting the turnstile that will admit you the next section of the tunnel: a large “cage”—maybe 50 feet long and the width of the tunnels. The cage is laid out into rows defined by a series of metal handrails controlling the flow of those coming and going. At the far end of the cage, and past the next line of bars which defines the far wall of the cage, you can just perceive a high bunker on the left and another on the right of the barred exit. The light in the cage is bright, but dim beyond. Although it is hard to be certain, you think you perceive a face peering through a slit high up on each bunker, and maybe a gun pointed your way. There are no IDF soldiers inside the cage, only travelers transiting into or out of Gaza. There is never more than a few people inside the cage at one time, and never both people coming and going. You line up at the turnstile, usually with a few others. Sometimes Palestinians show up at the turnstile in fairly large numbers. You wonder who they are, since locals are not usually allowed to cross this “VIP” crossing. If you are first in line, you occasionally push against the turnstile to see if it has been opened. There is no notice given, verbal or otherwise. After anywhere between 30 minutes to a couple of hours, the turnstile is opened, and one enters the cage. Only one person at a time is allowed on the cage side of the turnstile. If it has not occurred before, you wonder how much of what is going on is a deliberate attempt to humiliate those seeking to cross, and how much is due to legitimate security concerns. One proceeds in two stages: First you advance through the turnstile, down a row of metal handrails towards the far end. At a given—unmarked—point you are to stop, put down whatever you are carrying, take off any coat or outer clothing, raise your arms, and turn around 360 degrees. At some point in this process, a loudspeaker blares at high volume, with a harsh voice shouting some instructions to you. You do not know where the voice is coming from. It is garbled, and you do not understand what the orders are, or even what language is being spoken. If you do not know what is expected—where to stop, what to do when you get there—the voice is a certainty. When you do not comply, the loudspeaker blares again and again, seemingly more harsh each time. The effect is to make you feel confused, angry, and intimidated. Second, you then pick up your things, put your outer clothing on, and proceed to an airport type scanning machine, where you place metal items you’re carrying. You then pass through an arched metal detector, pick up your items, and go to the barred gate to the outside. You can now clearly see the two bunkers, each one 12 to 14 feet high, with only small slits at the top of each one, with a soldier at each one. After some wait, the gate creaks open (but not very far) and you pass through. You are now at the second Israeli check point. As you walk through the creaking gate, you are expected, without being told, to go to the end of the bunker on the right and hand over your passport to one of the IDF soldiers standing there. They are fully armed, with helmets, body armor, and some kind of large automatic weapon. As before, a soldier calls ahead to whoever is responsible for allowing you to pass. You wait, and are then handed back your passport. You now pass to the third Israeli check point. To get there, you just try to head in the opposite direction from where you started in Gaza. Nothing is marked, so you just try to wend your way around miscellaneous small buildings and walls, some of them raw concrete at least 14 feet high, until you spot a very large shed. This is the gate through which vehicles pass through from Israel to Gaza, and vice-versa. You see a low building on your right. You are now at the third Israeli check point. It is clean, well lit, and even has a few couches while one is waiting. You are reminded that this route is for VIPs only—not those with Palestinian IDs. There is usually a line of people waiting in front of a counter. When you arrive at the counter, an IDF soldier (no combat gear here, although most of the soldiers—male and female—are carrying those large automatic weapons over their shoulders. The soldier takes your passport, and you wait while he/she does something with it behind the counter. Who knows what ? There is no interpersonal contact, almost no eye contact. Then he/she calls someone else (yet again), and you are told to wait. After a time, usually less than 30 minutes, another soldier at another counter calls you. He/she hands you back your passport and a yellow gate pass. You then leave the visitors center, and proceed to the fourth Israeli check point, which is the gate that lets you into Israel. The soldiers there usually just take the yellow pass, and you proceed to a very large parking lot of car and trucks. For transportation back to Jerusalem, you either have the car you left there when you entered Erez, or you have arranged for a taxi. Stranded Palestinian families may ask to share your ride. Since it is the nice thing to do, and since the taxi driver makes a bit extra from it, you agree. You feel a wonderful release from tension walking out of that gate. It has taken you between one and a half to two hours, maybe much more, to pass through Erez. Counting the drive from Gaza City, adds another 30 minutes, at least. They say that after the first few crossings, it doesn’t depress and tire you so much, although some people never get used to it. NB: I wish to express my gratitude to Messrs Tom Neu and Rob Mosrie for their valuable comments on this letter. Richard Moore
Preface to This Letter Residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territories like myself, who travel widely, see or experience in one way or another nearly all of the phenomena set forth in this letter. These experiences inevitably raise questions in one’s mind what is going on and why. My professional and social ambit consists almost entirely of Palestinians from many walks of life, every one of which share these experiences, but of course in a much more direct and meaningful way. Each of them have stories to tell going back decades, about themselves, but also about their very large network of friends and family scattered throughout Palestine, the Middle East, and in many other countries. The Palestinian “diaspora” is remarkably extensive in terms of numbers and geography. In this fragmented “home” and beyond, Palestinian society is very tightly knit and incredibly well informed about the many networks they inhabit. The above influences, as well as wide reading on the Conflict going back more than 40 years, has resulted in the biases and assumptions that inform what is presented here. I endorse in principle the “liberal” notion that there are at least two sides to every situation. In fact, it is precisely that principle more than any other which impels me to try to communicate to those willing to listen to a side of the Conflict story which seems never to have gotten across to many or most even well-informed people in Europe and North America. I feel no sense of obligation to try to present a “balanced picture” (whatever that may be). The pro-Zionist/Israeli PR machine—local and international—has presented its rationale and justifications brilliantly for many years. I could not hope to emulate this record, even if I wanted to. Having said this, it is most important to acknowledge that Israeli opinion is far from unified as regards the Occupation. It is evident that many Israelis know what is going on and seek to influence state policy in more just and moral directions. Fortunately, Israel enjoys a free press (for Jews anyway), and is a cacophony of opinions on the Occupation and everything else. A major source on which I rely heavily for information and opinion is the national Israeli daily Haaretz. In addition, there are a number of Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian civil groups which routinely post information on the internet, and issue data and monographs. One challenge is that the various sources available to me take different positions on, or offer different data and interpretations of, the same events. Most have their own “point of view,” and many are not above being selective about the use of data and information to support it. My approach in the face of this is to seek what appears to be the “middle ground,” always testing each source against basic common sense as well as my own personal experience. Always seeking the “human story.” I readily acknowledge that no short-termer here can even hope to grasp all of the background, policies, economics and personal dynamics that, over more than 10 decades of the evolving “Palestine Problem,” have converged to produce today’s situation. More importantly, though, is the conviction that only those willing to address the cornucopia of painful facts and human stories coming out of here will ever approach a realistic, just, and humane understanding of today’s realities on the ground. As background, it must be kept in mind that Palestinians constitute probably the largest (at 3.6 million) and only ethnic group in the world which is utterly stateless, who have no civil rights, and who are completely under the control of an occupying state with vastly greater military power. They are in a condition of almost utter helplessness, and with no redress. The Land Grab This letter focuses on the strategy which the Israelis have aggressively implemented to take over Palestinian lands and properties. “Land grab” in this context refers to Israel’s systematic program to displace the indigenous Palestinian population from their lands and properties by all possible means, legal and illegal. The goal is, of course, to replace the Palestinians with Israeli Jews. The overall Israeli land-property grab strategy is complex and has many elements. The strategy can be divided into its direct and indirect components. This letter is divided into two parts which will be issued separately. The first part summarizes some of Israel’s efforts at grabbing land-property using direct methods. The second part, to be issued in a week or two, completes the overview, focusing on strategies which may goals in addition to grabbing land, but which inevitably and intentionally contribute to the achievement of that goal. Grabbing land from Palestinians is a fundamental, long-term strategy of the Israeli state. In fact, Jewish efforts to gain ownership or control of property in Palestine began long before Israel came into being. The current Israeli strategy is multi-dimensional. It is “integrated” because each element reinforces every other element in order to maximize progress toward the eventual goal of maximum Jewish ownership. It is impossible to forecast the ultimate outcome of this strategy, since the long-term goal has never been clearly articulated. However, statements made by national leaders (Ben-Gurion, Begin) as well as the religious right, share a clear vision of incorporating all the lands of Biblical Israel and Judea into the modern state of Israel. [Haaretz, (IHT,16 Feb.05] In any case, the issue is whether the Palestinians will eventually have a viable state of their own, and how much of their traditional homelands Palestinians will end up with. The following paragraphs summarize some of the key strategies for grabbing land directly. ►Keeping properties taken in the 1948 and 1967 wars. The UN Partition Plan of 1947 awarded the Jews 56% of British Mandate Palestine, even though they comprised only a third of the population (548,000 out of 1.75 million) and owned only 6% of the land. In the areas allocated to Israel, only about 57% was actually Jewish. Although the British Mandatory power, and those pushing the Plan at the UN, knew that this “solution” was unacceptable to the indigenous Arab population, the Plan was passed by the UN General Assembly in November 1947. The resulting, entirely predictable, war in 1948 left Israel in control of 78% of the country, including half the territory allocated by the UN to the Palestinians. The result was that about 750,000 Palestinians in areas now occupied by Israel became refugees. Only 100,000 remained in their homes. The Palestinians had lost entirely, or had lost control of, a large percentage of their properties. [Passia Diary, 2005; Halper: “Obstacles to Peace,” 2004] The 1948 loss of Palestinian lands was amplified as a result of the Israeli military successes of the 1967 war against Arab armies. The results of this conflict now meant that, among other territorial gains, Israel was now in control of the Golan Heights, and all-important East Jerusalem. The latter cannot be over-emphasized, since Israel has from its inception wanted to claim Jerusalem as its national capital. The 1967 boundaries are now considered by nearly all international opinion including the UN, to be the legal boundaries of Israel and thus the basis for an eventual Palestinian state. Israel has ignored the series of UN Resolutions beginning in 1948 calling for the “right of return” of refugees, placing Jerusalem outside Israel’s sovereignty, the withdrawal of Israel from lands taken in 1967, and for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian State, ►Property Confiscation and purchase. The new state of Israel seized or confiscated the lands of the Palestinian refugees it had driven off during the 1948 war. In late December 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194, which directed that refugees should be permitted to return to their homes at the earliest possible date. Alarmed, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion decided to sell this confiscated land to the private Jewish National Fund “to prevent any possibility of international pressure forcing Israel to restore it to the Palestinian refugees. “ At the time, Israel held about 3.5 million “dunams” (dunam= ¼ acre) of land owned by Palestinian refugees—about one-sixth of Israel’s total area. The sticking point was that Israeli law at the time did not permit the state to sell the land against the will of the owners. To get around this, in 1950 the Absentee Property Law was passed, and the Development Authority was created. The Development Authority is a quasi-government body able to sell these lands for any purpose. According to the Absentee Property Law, everyone outside of Israel between November 1947 and September 1948 (during which the 1948 War took place) is considered an “absentee” whose assets were to be transferred to the Custodian of Absentee Properties, with no possibility of appeal or compensation. In the years between 1950 and 2004, the Absentee Property Law, and other laws, permitted the confiscation of all the assets left behind by the Palestinian refugees in 1948. A Kafka-esque feature of this law stipulated that Palestinians who were now Israeli citizens—dubbed in double-speak as “present absentees”—would also have some of their property “transferred” to Israel. [Haaretz, 21 January ‘05]. Then, in mid 2004, in a secret decision, the Israeli cabinet decided for the first time to apply the law to East Jerusalem, thereby confiscating thousands of dunams of land from their owners in the West Bank. Even though Israel does not permit West Bank residents to enter East Jerusalem and become residents, the cabinet decreed that—because they are not residents—the owners would not be able to use their own lands in the future, and that the property now belongs to Israel. This law has caused thousands of Palestinians to lose property overnight, often property that is right next to them. All of these properties are inside the area annexed by Israel in 1967. These properties are worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and the owners will receive no compensation. Although a recent court decision has suspended this law, it has not invalidated the law. It could thus be implemented again at any time. The purchase of lands and properties in Palestine has a long history. The Jewish National Fund was established in 1901, at the fifth World Zionist Congress, to raise funds in order to buy land in Palestine, thus helping to lay the foundation for a national home for the Jews. As noted above, by 1949, the JNF had become an active agent of state policy. Another land purchase entity---Himnuta—was founded in 1938 as a subsidiary of the JNF. Himnuta later facilitated and accelerated the purchase of land in areas of strategic importance near the Green Line—the 1967 Armistice Line--in Judea and Samaria, as well as land near the Jerusalem settlements to advance the goal of contiguous Jewish enclaves. JNF established Himnuta “to carry out complex and discreet transactions,” and very little about Himnuta is made public thanks to its secretive behavior. The housing ministry also uses Himnuta services, for example when it gave the agency 3.6 million shekels in public funds to buy the historic St John’s Hospice building in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City. The transaction was facilitated by the “Ateret Cohanim,” an extremist Jewish group whose goal is to Judaize the Christian and Muslim Quarters of the Old City. [Haaretz, 17 Feb.05] Via land purchases, reinforced by discriminatory permits and demolition by the government, the Ateret Cohanim and other extremist organizations have targeted the Muslim Quarter in particular for takeover. (Passia, 2005). ►Settlers. Although dating only from 1977, the use of Settlers is a core element of national Land Grab strategy, and with GOI support they have expanded their occupation of Palestinian land exponentially. Menachem Begin “came to power in 1977 with a vision of incorporating…all the lands of Biblical Israel and Judea into the modern state of Israel.” He seized on the idea of settlements in occupied territory to further this goal. (IHT, 16 Feb.05). In the first instance, the settlement blocks needed to be large and numerous in order to incorporate the West Bank, in particular, into the rest of Israel, and to make the Occupation irreversible. A second aspect of the settlements is that they are deliberately designed to divide up Palestinian communities into many small and isolated enclaves—in effect into Bantustans reminiscent of South Africa during the Apartheid period. One intended effect of this balkanization of Palestinian lands is to preclude the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Since 1977, more than 200 settlements have been established on occupied land, and 400,000 Israelis have moved across the 1967 boundaries. Although the Israeli government has repeatedly promised to halt settlements, and formally agreed to do this under the Middle East Peace Plan, according to a recent story in the Israeli press (the Aharonot Yediot newspaper), the Israeli government is planning to build more than 6,000 houses this year in settlements in the West Bank. In recent years, the population in West Bank settlements has been increasing by approximately 10,000 annually. This number will not only violate their promise, but will actually represent a sharp increase from earlier years. In an exercise of misleading logic, Israel argues that this prohibition against increasing settlements does not apply to existing settlements. [IHT, 26-27 February 2005]. Settler activity in and around Jerusalem deserves special mention. From the outset, Israel has adamantly insisted on and planned to make Jerusalem its capital. Here again, settlers have a major role to play. The government and Jewish private groups have been furiously active in creating a settler cordon around The Old City, with its holy sites. The goal is to establish large Jewish enclaves in and around East Jerusalem—which has always had a majority Arab population. The plan is to form a ring around the city and link the settlements together in an unbroken chain in order to seal off north and east Jerusalem from Palestinians in the West Bank. By moving settlers up to the West Bank Wall, Jewish communities would form a substitute barrier, even if the Wall should be removed at some point. To achieve this, the GOI has consistently broken its own laws and regulations in order to move ahead with its encirclement program. The record is clear that Israel has never kept its promises over the years to halt the creation of new settlements. Even after the Oslo Accords, and the signing of the so-called “Road Map,” “construction continues outside settlement boundaries in more than 21 West Bank settlements, with more than 1,834,000 meters of land…added to existing settlements.” All of this is taking place on private Palestinian land. (IHT, 3 Feb.05). Meanwhile, settlers are described by conservative elements as Israel’s “first line of defense” against Palestinian terrorists. The news these days is full of stories about the brave fight that the prime minister is putting up to remove the settlements from Gaza. Note, however, the real motive. “Sharon has said repeatedly since he unveiled his disengagement plan in December 2003…that dismantling the settlements in Gaza and the northern West Bank would make it possible for Israel to hold onto the large West Bank settlement blocs. . .” (Jerusalem Post, 20 Feb.05). In the last letter, the focus was on the policies and measures used by the Zionists, and later the Israeli state, to take over land owned by Palestinians, and to do so by all means, legal and illegal. Although the activities were and are intricate and not always well-known, the intent and the outcomes were unequivocal and relatively easy to measure. There is, however, a second set of related measures which have a less direct relationship with the continuing Israeli goal of taking over Palestinian land. They are thus more difficult to perceive in the land grab context. Moreover, these indirect measures are easier for the Israelis to justify (to the poorly informed and to those with closed minds) solely for the purpose of enhancing security against terrorists. Even accepting that security is an important raison d’être for these “indirect” measures, there can be no question that there is another, equally important, longer-term rationale behind them: to create widespread hardship and trauma for Palestinians. And to keep this pressure on them to the point where they will submit to Israeli dictates, will not demand their rights, will sell their lands and properties and, eventually, just leave their homeland entirely. This letter provides a brief overview of these measures. ►Restricted mobility. This policy has been spectacularly effective. For example, at this time no Palestinian can live in a location, or move from one location to another, without permission from the Israeli state—for ANY reason. This means that, without Israeli permission, no Gazans can live in or travel to the West Bank, Jerusalem, or Israel ;no WB residents can live in or travel to Jerusalem or Gaza; and even movement inside the West Bank and Gaza is tightly controlled, by permits and check points. The restrictions go deep into the most routine practices. For example, only Palestinians who are residents of Jerusalem can drive cars with Yellow (Israeli) license plates, which permit them to travel to and from the West Bank—but not to Gaza. Conversely, Palestinian residents of the West Bank can only drive cars with White (Palestinian) license plates, and can only drive in the West Bank, or within Gaza. Come July 2005, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem will not be allowed to go to Ramallah, which is the largest town in the West Bank, and is very close to Jerusalem. Those who want to go to Ramallah will then have to ask for special permits. This will work a particular hardship on Jerusalem Palestinians, many of whom work in Ramallah, and have close family, economic, and social ties there. Moreover, Palestinians know that having to ask for a permit means that the Shin Bet (Israeli security agency) will try to enlist them as collaborators willing to “tell all” about family, friends, and colleagues. Those who refuse are subject to long-term refusal to issue a permit with no chance of appeal—a fate suffered by a close colleague of the author. Experience shows that the humiliation, difficulties, and threats involved in getting a permit reduces the number of those asking for one. As a result, Jerusalem residents may in the long run simply give up their residence in Jerusalem completely and move to Ramallah, or other West Bank towns. This is surely what the Israeli governments have been hoping to achieve. [Haaretz, 26 Jan.05] In addition to the above, no one from the West Bank and Gaza is permitted to use the national airport in Tel Aviv without a permit, and these are hard to get. Moreover, the Israelis have closed the Gaza airport and sea port. The alternative for the majority who cannot get an Israeli permit, is to leave and enter the country by overland routes. The check points controlling these routes are frequently closed, without notice, for weeks at a time. An additional restriction on mobility is effected by requiring that Palestinians can only return through the external check point from which they left the West Bank or Gaza. A colleague of the author tells of his experience with permits. He is one of the lucky Palestinians with an Israeli ID, which allows him to travel easily in Palestine and Israel. Eight years ago, though, he married a Palestinian from Bethlehem, with only a West Bank permit. She is allowed to live in Jerusalem with her husband, on a renewable permit, but is not allowed to visit her family in Bethlehem. Since she cannot pass through the check point into Bethlehem, my colleague drops her off before arriving at the check point, where she has to climb over a large mountain into her home town. My colleague then drives through the check point and meets her on the Bethlehem side, hours later. One time, my colleague tried to pass the check point with his 7-month old son. The soldiers at the check point told him that he could go through but not the baby, even though the child was listed on his ID card. At this point he had to turn back, drive to the point where he had dropped off his wife. He then proceeded to search for her, babe in arms, for six hours, to hand her the baby which she had to carry the rest of the way over the mountain. The maze of regulations about who can go where, who qualifies for permits, and under what conditions, is almost impossible for a new arrival to comprehend. To amplify the effect of these controls, the IDF changes its rules frequently and with no notice. Added to this is the effect of The Wall (referred to by Israel as the “security fence”); The Check Points, of which there are more than 736, manned by armed soldiers; The Road Blocks and Frequent ID checks; and the The Special Roads which only Israelis can use. Like The Wall, some of these roads cut across existing local access roads, helping to cut Palestinian villages off from the rest of the country, either canceling mobility entirely, or forcing long detours for even short trips. For example, the IDF is now building a road in the heart of the Hebron municipality in order to provide contiguity between the tiny (six family) settlement of Tel Romeida and a larger nearby settlement enclave. The road will be built on expropriated Palestinian land, which incidentally parallels an existing road which has been closed to Palestinians for eight years. Palestinians who own this expropriated property have been unable to reach their nearby lands for the last four years because they are near settler’s houses. [Haaretz, 28 February 2005] It is important to repeat that all of this takes place inside, and only inside, the West Bank and Gaza, and on Palestinian land. The Wall is an explicit instrument for adding land and isolating Palestinian communities. Even though, under international pressure, the state decided recently to redraw the route, which Israel now claims will still incorporate 7% of the West Bank, and will also incorporate about 10,000 Palestinians on the Israeli side of the Wall. Even with these modifications, Israel is violating the internationally accepted boundaries which are those established in 1967. In fact, the percentage of West Bank land that is likely to be cut off by the Wall is not 7%, but nearly 50%, once several factors are taken into account. Israeli calculations don't include annexed Jerusalem. Israeli calculations also do not include the "fingers" (fences around settlement blocks such as the town of Ariel, which for all practical purposes will be west of the Wall, as Sharon has promised the settlers). They also do not include the restricted areas around the roads that will transect the West Bank and cut the Palestinian areas into cantons connected in part by tunnels. Finally, Israeli calculations do not include the greater Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea, which are in effect separated from Palestinian access by patrols and checkpoints that restrict the use of roads to yellow-plate vehicles. Every Palestinian observer assumes that an "Eastern Wall" will be built; and, even if Israelis avoid talking about it for now, they have put the legal restrictions in place already. This maze of barriers severely restricts, or eliminates entirely, access by all Palestinians (without Israeli citizenship) to jobs, agricultural lands, health care, schools, travel outside the country, family, and friends. The impact of these barriers to mobility has been dramatic. For example, the World Bank estimates that Gross National Income declined by 38% from 1999 to 2002, and that 47% of all Palestinians live under the $2.10 per day poverty line. Since September 2000, the number of poor Palestinians has tripled to over two million, and more than 60% of households have lost more than half their income. More than half a million Palestinians are completely dependent on food aid, and suffer from an un-employment level of 34% of the workforce—29% in the West Bank, and 40% in Gaza. [HDIP, “Health and Segregation” 2004. Haaretz, 17 March 2005]. In addition, stories of women in labor having to deliver at a check point while they wait for (or are denied) permission to get to a hospital are common. Similarly, survival rates for breast cancer in Gaza have fallen to 30% to 40%, versus rates of 70%-75% for Jewish women in Israel. A major cause of this alarming differential is said to be that Palestinian doctors are not allowed to leave Gaza for advanced training in the West Bank or abroad. [Haaretz, 3 March’05] ►House Demolitions Since September 2004, in Gaza alone, the IDF has demolished 2,370 houses, leaving about 23,000 people homeless. In addition, during 2004, IDF demolished 1,356 homes for “exposure” purposes, leaving 10,418 people homeless. “Exposing” happens when the IDF decides it wishes to tear down houses and buildings by the side of roads or near settlements to prevent sneak attacks. Anyone even suspected of being a terrorist can have his house demolished. It is reported that 97% of the demolitions take place too soon for the victims to appeal, or even salvage their household goods. Needless to say, the victims of these demolitions are never compensated. One of the interesting features of Israel’s demolition policy is how it exposes Israeli attitudes towards these immoral and illegal acts. In February 2005, the defense minister and the army decided that it’s 15-year policy of punitive house demolitions should stop since the practice “may not be a deterrent and may even do harm.” [Haaretz, 20 Feb.05] “Harm” in this case refers to the harm to Israel’s image (and fund raising ability) abroad—not to the Palestinians. Thus, the decision to stop demolitions was made on the grounds of efficacy, with no concern for morality or human rights. One sees precisely the same amoral mind-set towards the confiscation of lands and properties. Another major excuse for house demolitions is given when a Palestinian constructs or even improves a property without the proper permit. It is widely known that in many areas, such as the Old City, even in the Muslim Quarter, the Israeli authorities will not give such permits to Palestinians. By contrast, they are readily available to Jews (helped by the Ateret Cohinim), and enforcement appears not to take place with Jewish buyers & property improvers. Today, as one walks through the Old City, many of the old dwellings have obvious modern improvements; a sure sign of a Jewish resident. ►Harassment & Intimidation. In addition to the mechanisms summarized above, a wide range of additional strategies are used. These include: “special” security screenings at the national airport for those lucky Palestinians who get permission to use it; discriminatory policies which restrict or forbid Palestinians from buying property or improving it; discriminatory access to competitive mortgage and interest rates; mass arrests and lengthy terms of administrative detention without trial for suspected or minor offenses; and the humiliation, intimidation, deportation, and assassination of national leaders, as well as “the man on the street.” It is hard to predict just how much of this it will take to cause the Palestinians to lose heart, to succumb to the pressures and harassments and deprivations. To stop struggling for their rights, to give up their patrimony, and do as the Israelis want them to. That is, to just leave. The trouble is, aside from continuing small and feeble acts of terrorism against the Israel occupation and land theft, and short of just leaving the Occupied Palestinian Territories to the Jews, what options do they have to get relief, not to mention justice ? Even leaving is no solution, since no country in the world would be willing to accept anything like the number that might be needed to satisfy the Israeli end game. Where will this end ? Richard Moore
Observations Enroute to the Jordan Border I recently drove from Ramallah near Jerusalem to the Jordan border crossing, just east of Galilee. The countryside one passes through during this drive is divided into three distinct terrains. The first terrain, near Ramallah, is hilly and rocky, dotted with olive trees. The next terrain begins at the edge of the Jordan River Valley. Since the elevation around Ramallah is about 500 meters, and the elevation at the bottom of the Jordan Valley is minus 400 meters, the drop is nearly 900 meters, or 3000 feet. Thus, the view from the edge, and the drive down the vertiginous road are dramatic. The view across this relatively narrow valley to the equally high Moab Mountains on the Jordan side is wonderful. As students of geography know, the Jordan Valley is part of the Rift Valley, which runs 6000 miles from Lebanon to Mozambique. This helps to explain its depth. The third terrain is the valley floor which is—in spring at least—very green and heavily cultivated. Given the year-round warm weather in this valley, spring and summer crops are already being harvested in early March and sent to market. This letter describes observations made by my Palestinian driver, Jamal, during this 2 ½ hour drive. It should be noted that nearly the entire area described here is within the 1967 borders of Palestine, although utterly controlled by Israel. As we enter the main road heading north, the driver (who until recently drove a taxi) pointed out a place in the road where, a year or two ago, he had picked up an old woman standing by the road in his taxi. As required by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), he had asked if she had a Jerusalem ID, and she replied in the affirmative. The reason for the question is that Jersusalem-Israel “yellow plate” cars are not allowed to have West Bank (WB) Palestinians in their cars for ANY reason. A few hundred meters after picking her up he was stopped by Israeli police and questioned about his passenger. When it turned out that she had only a WB ID, they promptly put Jamal in hand cuffs, and sent him to prison for 35 days. The old woman admitted that she had lied to him, but this made no difference to the police, or later, the court. He described the filthiness of Israeli jails, the voracious bed bugs, and the meager food of the very lowest quality. Further up the main road, just north of Ramallah, you enter into a broad valley. On a low hillside some distance on the right there is the large Israeli settlement of Ofrah. The established settlements are immediately recognizable by sameness of their modern construction and red tile roofs. The driver points out the high wire fence running alongside the road, beginning several miles before the entrance of the settlement. The settlement, and the several hundred acres of fields isolated by the fence have been built on confiscated Palestinian lands. The fields are devoid of crops, with only an abandoned Palestinian house to break up the emptiness. Further on, you enter a steep, winding pass with high hills on both sides. This time, Palestinian houses line the top of both hills. The hillsides are covered with marvelous olive trees of ancient lineage, owned by the residents at the top of hills. The driver informs you that—for some reason—the Israelis have decided that the owners of these trees cannot harvest their olives. Trees in a nearby olive grove show signs of having been exposed to fire. According to the driver, the local settlers did this just a year ago, with the IDF standing by watching it happen. He doesn’t know why they did it, but guesses it was to show their contempt for the Palestinians, and to pressure them to leave the area. A few kilometers later, you see a large field which is half occupied by large, old olive trees, while the other half is covered with newly planted olive saplings about 30 inches high. The driver explains that, originally, the entire field had been a long-standing Palestinian olive grove. By some means, the local settlers were able to “acquire” all or part of it, and then proceeded to rip out the old trees, and replace them with the saplings. The rationale is, apparently, that the saplings—the olive grove to-be after 10 or more years—would then not only be owned by the settlers, but would also have been created by them ! This presumably strengthens their perhaps tenuous claim to ownership. The other advantage they derive from this odd behavior is that they can sell these “free” mature trees to landscapers in Israel for high prices. I have personally seen many flatbed trucks on Israeli roads carrying these liberated mature trees to market. Apparently, the frantic pace of wall and fence construction, as well as the usual high levels of settler activity, have displaced many thousands of these valuable trees. As you drive along, you can spot settlements on many hilltops, maybe on every 5th or 6th hilltop observable from the road. Some are very high up, and far from the road. The roads up to these hilltop sites in this very hilly and rocky landscape are new and are of excellent quality. The settlements and the roads, of course, represent an enormous investment of public funds. The settlements are basically of two types, permanent and temporary. The permanent ones enjoy modern, good quality construction, with the roads, schools, and other amenities that would find in any first world middle class community. Some of these cover large areas and have hundreds of houses. The “temporary” settlements consist of a gaggle of house trailers—a few or many—surrounded by the usual wire fence. All enjoy security provided by the IDF, which includes armed soldiers, watch towers, American made military vehicles, and one or more elaborate communications antennas. In areas with several Palestinian communities, or one larger one, the Israelis have placed watch towers to keep an eye on them. These towers are cylindrical, dark gray steel, about 40 feet high, with a row of tiny windows around the top for the watchers, who cannot be seen from outside. Something out of Star Wars. The really remarkable thing about these Palestinian villages is, however, that the village roads have been permanently blocked where they intersect the main roads. This means that locals are not allowed to use their cars on the main road for any reason: not school, not jobs, not health care, not to take crops to market, not to visit friends or relatives outside the village. If they do need to go somewhere they have the option of walking, riding a donkey, or trying to catch one of the relatively scarce white plate (West Bank) taxis that ply the main road. I noted, for example, that it was 10 kilometers from one village to the nearest school. The children—even the little ones—have to walk this distance twice a day. Even if the local farmers could get their produce into a taxi, they would not be allowed to take it through Israeli checkpoints. These travel and trade restrictions have are in effect in all the Palestinian zones controlled by Israelis. Which is to say all of Palestine if they so decide. I was reminded of the villages west of Jerusalem which have also been blocked from using any main road. Because of this, those seeking work are forced to walk all the way to Ramallah for work, a 3-4 hour walk each way. Jamal tells me that he has seen them at 0300-0400 in the morning heading for Ramallah. I was bemused by one community we passed. It is in a small valley that is particularly verdant and beautiful, with dramatic hills surrounding it. The amusing thing is that the community is filled with a dozen or 20 homes that would not be out of place in Palm Springs. The houses are all large, very elaborate, and obviously very expensive. Jamal points out that every house is shuttered, and there is no one in sight. He explains that all these houses were built by rich Palestinians who live outside the country, and who come here only for short visits. You think back on all the palatial houses in Ramallah and some other towns, and wonder what role in local politics and economics these “diaspora” Palestinians play. Just before beginning the descent into the Jordan Valley, there is a check point said to be infamous among Palestinians for the delays and bad treatment they receive there. We pass through easily with our yellow license plates, then see a long line of Palestinian cars waiting several hundred yards in front of the checkpoint. Jamal says that waits of 3-4 hours are routine. He has no explanation for this “special treatment” given in this particular place. The Jordan Valley is lush and heavily farmed. Jamal says that these farms are a mix of kibbutz and moshav. A kibbutz is a cooperative farm with everything owned in common by the residents, who share its revenues. In a moshav, the land is owned by individuals who earn in proportion to their share of the land, but who share in the common costs of running the enterprise—rather like a condominium apartment arrangement. Given the increase in land prices, many kibbutzim and moshavim residents have become wealthy. By contrast, driving north towards the Jordan crossing, some lands are distinct in having makeshift, tent-like structures on them, set back from the road. These are Palestinians who do subsistence farming on this land. They have to buy water from the kibbutz/moshav who control it. Although they are permitted to farm here (on their own land), like those villagers in the West Bank highlands they are not allowed to use the roads to take their produce to market, nor are they allowed to build permanent structures on their own land. Instead, they have to try to sell whatever they grow alongside the road, next to their fields, a few kilos or bushel basket at a time. They live in squalor and there are no schools. The children work alongside their parents in the fields. As you near the Jordan crossing, you pass through a handsome, modern town named Beit She’an, now 100% Jewish. Like dozens or hundreds of towns in occupied Palestine/Israel, this town was an Arab town named Bisan, and had been so for many hundreds of years. When the Israelis expelled or simply ethnically cleansed the Arabs, they systematically Judaized the names of these towns. I read an interview in the Israeli press with an elderly gentlemen whose career it had been to oversee this renaming exercise. He seemed very pleased with his life’s work. At the Israeli side of the crossing into Jordan, one encounters the usual impassive truculence from the border officials. You also encounter the usual Israeli aversion to putting signs on anything to help visitors know what to do or where to go. Standing at the crossing, all paper work done, one can see the Jordan border entrance only 50 meters away. Rather than wait 30 minutes for a bus to take me on the five-minute ride, and seeing no sign, I decided to walk over. Suddenly, “officials” appeared from nowhere to insist that I wait for the bus, then scolded the bus driver, who was just sitting there, for not stopping me. And, although purely impressionistic to say so, the entire atmosphere on the Jordan side was so very different: calm, friendly, and relaxed. No watchtowers, no guns everywhere, no punitive checkpoints or “flying road blocks,” and no cutting people off from their livelihoods, schools, friends and health care It is not too much to hope that the Palestinians will treat people in just the same friendly and humane way when they are finally able to control the borders and the interior of their own country.
Richard
Moore
The Occupation of Hebron Hebron is one of the oldest cities in the world, first created by the Canaanites over 5500 years ago. It is a city of 162, 000 people located 40 kilometers south of Jerusalem in the southern part of the West Bank. The city is scattered across many hills. Hebron’s principal distinction is that it is the burial place of Abraham and Sarah, as well as Isaac, Rebecca, Jacob, and Leah. It is important to note that this is an important religious site for Muslims as well as Jews. The tombs are inside the large, old Ibrahimi Mosque, Ibrahim being the Arabic name for Abraham, a name which is popular throughout the Muslim world. The mosque is inside the Old City. Throughout the centuries of the Diaspora, Hebron has been home to a small Jewish community. The arrival of the more assertive Zionist Jews during the early decades of the 20th Century, with their openly stated goal of creating a Jewish state, created communal tensions. These led to riots in mid 1929, during which up to 100 Jewish residents of Hebron were killed. Following this episode, the Jewish community left the city, reappeared briefly in the 1930s, and then returned in triumph in 1968, making Hebron the first West Bank town occupied by Jewish settlers following the 1967 War The return of the Jewish settlers to Hebron was organized by the religious fundamentalist Rabbi Moshe Levinger. He rounded up a group of about 30 would-be settlers via a newspaper ad and they headed straight to the heart of the city to begin their occupation. Appreciating the intentional provocation this represented, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan ordered them to leave, but agreed to relocate them to a nearby site, in what is now the large settlement of Kiryat Arba with more than 7,000 people. To create Kiryat Arba, the Israeli government confiscated 4,400 dunams (one dunam=1/4 acre) of Palestinian land then, later, 1600 more as the settlement continued to expand at the edge of the city. Other settlers replaced them inside the city, however, so that by the early 1970s twenty Jewish families were squatting in homes that had belonged to Palestinians. As part of the Oslo Agreements, it was envisioned that control of occupied Palestinian cities would be transferred to the Palestinian Authority. As an interim arrangement, agreements were signed in 1995 and 1997, between the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis—the so-called Interim Agreement and Hebron Protocol, respectively. These agreements divided the city into two parts. The larger part referred to as H1, with a population of about 120,000, comprises the newer part of the city, and is under Palestinian control. The smaller part—with about 40,000 Palestinians—is called H2 and includes the Old City. It is under Israeli control. Approximately 10,000 Palestinians still live inside the Old City. The Oslo negotiators did not see this as the final resolution of the conflict, but as a way to improve the situation until the final settlement could be reached. Ominously, no sooner had Netanyahu signed the Protocol than he began to disown it. oday, some 40 settlers are living in four tiny settlements inside of or immediately adjacent to Hebron’s Old City, with approximately 400 Israeli soldiers stationed there to protect the settlers from their immediate Palestinian neighbors, numbering 10,000 or so. In Hebron as a whole, there are at least 4000 Israeli soldiers, with watch towers on most hills to spy on and control the locals. While two settlements-- Tel Romeida and Kiryat Arba--are on the immediate periphery of the Old City, three are inside it. Each of these is cordoned off by military outposts, check points, barriers of all kinds, and controlled access to all streets in their vicinity. These settlements include: šBeit Hadassa. This settlement consists of a single building, from which the Palestinian residents were expelled in 1979. To accommodate newcomers, a new five-story building was constructed—with funds contributed by private American donors--and several families were brought to live there. The Israeli military protects the settlement with a military outpost. Feeling the need for further “security” the military demolished all nearby Palestinian stores and buildings. šAvraham Avinu, was built next to the wholesale vegetable market of Hebron. To give the settlement room to grow, the Israeli military closed the market and allowed settlers and military personnel to occupy some of the adjacent houses after expelling the Palestinian residents. Since then, settlers have been taking over the closed Palestinian stores, with the entire area now closed to Palestinians. šBeit Romano. The Palestinian Education Office in Hebron was housed in a school in the middle of Hebron until 1982. In that year, the Israelis took it over to create the Beit Romano settlement. As elsewhere, this was not enough, so they next took over the old Central Bus Station to use as a military base. Attacks, Harassment, and Restrictions on Movement Due to its religious importance to Jews, Hebron has become a stronghold for religious extremists among the larger settler movement, many of whom are predisposed towards religious conservatism. In fact, both the Muslims and the Jews in Hebron are from the conservative end of the spectrum. Among the most extreme and militant of these in the Hebron area (and elsewhere) are the Gush Emunim (“Bloc of the Faithful”) and even more so, the radical and often violent Kach and Kahane Chai organizations. Settlers who belong to or sympathize with these organizations have never been hesitant to use terrorist measures against the Palestinian majority, knowing that they are under the protection of the Israeli military, and are subject to much more benign legal consequences than the hapless Palestinians. For example, Dr Baruch Goldstein, an American-Israeli member of Kach, entered the Ibrahimi Mosque in early February 1994 and massacred 29 Muslim worshippers, and injured 125 more. Harassment, provocations and attacks by radical settlers against Palestinian civilians, even against school children, have been a common occurrence for years, and continue to the present day. In an attempt to bring some measure of sanity to counter this kind of savage behavior, several groups of international volunteers have placed staff in H2 to protect children, and women trying to get to the market or to access health care, from the settlers. There are even anecdotal reports of Israeli military personnel stepping in to shield local women and children from these attacks. In addition to plain hatred and contempt for Palestinians, this uncivilized behavior is motivated by the desire to force them out of the areas of Hebron they covet, and preferably out of “Greater Israel” entirely. Restrictions on movement continue to increase. A number of measures have been imposed by the IDF which have effectively restricted the movement of H2 residents. For example: šOver the last three years, the IDF has imposed 600s days of full or partial curfew on H2 residents—Palestinians only, of course. Full curfew means total house arrest. Partial curfew means as little as one hour a day to buy food which, under such conditions, is often not available. šA settler-only road is being built which will connect every settlement to each other and to the Mosque-Tomb of Abraham. This road will utilize a major existing road, splitting H2 and the Old City in half; will impose upon the Palestinians bizarre “detours” through surrounding neighborhoods to go even short distances, and; will close off all access by local residents. Of course, to build this road through ancient neighborhoods necessitates clearing out the existing historical sites, houses, and businesses, with no possibility of appeal or recourse. šThe IDF is now in the process of closing off all access to/from old city with a series of gates at every entrance. For some time now, for certain streets, only residents are allowed to come and go, and then only with special passes issued at the whim of the Israeli occupiers. No (Arab) visitors allowed. Another feature of the policy is that locals can take their goods out, but are not allowed to bring furniture or personal items into the area. This draconian policy is being extended to the entire area. šAfter the Baruch Goldstein slaughter, the IDF divided the Ibrahimi Mosque down the middle: half for the Jews, and half for the Arabs. Given the differences in numbers, locals may have to wait for an hour or more in the sun to get in, and are subjected to far more severe security checks than the Jews. The Impact Hebron’s Old City, once an important social and economic center for Palestinians from the entire southern area of the West Bank, is today a hollowed-out shell—a ghost town. As the noose tightens around H2 in general, and the Old City in particular, the streets in the town have become increasingly deserted and empty. Before the arrival of the settlers in 1967, the Old City’s Palestinian population was about 80,000. As noted, the number is down to 10,000 and falling. Needless to say, socio-economic conditions, especially unemployment, are beyond bad. Already, thousands of small businesses have closed—as many as 2500, with at least 600 of them in the small area of Old City alone. To add to the harassment, the University of Hebron was closed for nearly a year, reopening only last September. Conclusion The manner in which these settlements in and immediately adjacent to H2 were created help to reveal the occupation process in Hebron and indeed throughout the OPT. This process tends to follow predictable steps: first, land is taken over for settlements with a “security” zone around each one to keep the locals at bay; then land between the settlements is taken over; the next step is to build “special access” roads to join the settlements; and finally a security zone around the entire area is declared. With each step in the process, the ability of the Palestinians to move in and out of their villages, homes, and shops is further restricted. While part of the motive for this tightening noose is to protect settlers and ensure their freedom of movement, there can be no question that an equally important motive is to force the locals out of their homes and businesses in order to create Jewish-only areas. It is hard to understand why the blatant human rights violations which have been taking place in Hebron since at least 1968 have received so little notice, even by people who live in Occupied Palestinian Territory and who are interested in such things. Even those jaded by the serial outrages visited upon the Palestinians since 1948 are stirred by the excesses of the Hebron Occupation when they see it at first hand. Needless to say, what has happened in Hebron could not have taken place without the full financial, military, and political support of the ruling Israeli political and military establishment. This clearly puts into relief that Hebron is only one piece of the puzzle in realizing Israel’s goals and colonization strategy. As has been evident to anyone wishing to know, settlements are the implementation arm for expanding the Jewish state to the fullest extent, constrained only by diplomatic, demographic, and economic realities. It seems likely, indeed certain, that the national hysteria accompanying the pullout of settlers from Gaza will put a halt to slowing settler expansion in the WB or—heaven forbid—evacuating more than a few isolated trailer trash outposts, while leaving the many large and well established settlements intact, and continuing to expand. As for the fate of H2, I have no doubt whatever that the settlers and their patrons in the Israeli establishment will continue to pursue their present course. Within the next few years, Palestinian state or no, we can expect to see the Jews in total control of the parts of H2 which they covet, with virtually Jews-only as residents of the Old City. Which “friends” of the Palestinians, or indeed of plain human rights, will step forward to try to keep that from being the end game ? Richard Moore 21 August 2005 | |